Legal issues relating to the use of surrogate mothers in the practice of assisted conception by Slabbert, MN
Healthcare professionals specialising in assisted conception are 
often confronted with practical scenarios for which the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005, which regulates surrogate motherhood, does not 
provide clear answers. Consider the following scenario (resem-
bling a real situation):
Dr X, a fertility specialist with consulting rooms in South Africa, is 
approached by Mr and Mrs A, the commissioning parents, who 
wish to enter into a contract with Miss B, a surrogate mother. It 
appears that Mrs A’s infertility is irreversible and permanent. Mr 
and Mrs A are both domiciled in Lesotho, although Mrs A spends 
three weeks a month in South Africa, where she is permanently 
employed. The surrogate mother, also a Lesotho national and a 
sister of Mr A, has accompanied Mr and Mrs A to Dr X’s consulting 
rooms. Dr X is uncertain whether he is permitted in terms of South 
African law to assist the infertile couple and artificially inseminate 
Miss B with Mr A’s sperm. Mr and Mrs A also enquire whether Miss 
B has the right to terminate the surrogate motherhood agreement, 
should Dr X be able to assist them, and what their rights in respect 
of a valid surrogate motherhood agreement are. This is the first 
time a patient has brought her own surrogate mother to Dr X, as he 
normally uses surrogate mothers who are recruited by an agency 
through web advertising.
The above scenario is certainly not an extraordinary one, but poses 
very specific and often intricate legal questions with which profession-
als specialising in artificial insemination are frequently confronted.
Surrogate motherhood is currently comprehensively regulated in 
South African law following the promulgation of chapter 19 of the 
Children’s Act on 1 April 2010.1 Prior to this, altruistic surrogacy 
arrangements were subject to contract law and legislation and 
regulations pertaining to artificial insemination,2 with the status of 
the child born as a result of such an arrangement determined by 
the now repealed Children’s Status Act.3 One very important con-
sequence of the new statutory position is that the Children’s Act 
limits surrogacy to persons who are domiciled in South Africa, with 
a limited exception, as will be discussed below, making South Af-
rica a less attractive ‘reproductive tourism’ destination.4 A second 
is that any commercial surrogacy agreement is considered invalid 
and unenforceable, as well as a crime.5
This article briefly discusses the relevant legal requirements that 
relate to the conclusion of surrogate agreements generally, in-
cluding reference to recent case law in this regard, followed by a 
discussion of the legal requirements that relate to the surrogate 
mother specifically, including the issue whether the surrogate 
mother has the right to terminate the surrogate motherhood agree-
ment. Next considered is the artificial insemination of the surro-
gate mother, which must comply with provisions from both the 
Children’s Act and relevant health legislation and regulations. In 
the final instance, the article investigates the kind of payments that 
may be made to surrogate mothers, based on recent case law, 
as well as the question whether agencies may advertise for the 
services of surrogate mothers. From this discussion, a few ethical 
concerns emerge, which are briefly referred to.
Legal requirements relating specifically 
to the surrogate motherhood agreement 
The Children’s Act contains specific requirements relating to the 
contents of surrogate motherhood agreements. These agree-
ments must be in writing and confirmed by the High Court.6 This 
specific requirement makes it clear that a written contract between 
a surrogate mother and commissioning parents will be invalid if not 
confirmed by the High Court. In addition, a surrogate motherhood 
agreement will also be invalid unless:
• the agreement is signed by all the parties thereto (including the 
partner or spouse of the surrogate mother, if applicable)7
• the agreement is concluded in South Africa8
• at least one of the commissioning parents, or in the case of only 
one commissioning parent, this person, is domiciled in South 
Africa at the time that the agreement is entered into9
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• the surrogate mother (and her husband or partner, if relevant) 
are domiciled in South Africa at the time of entering into the con-
tract10 
• the agreement is confirmed by the High Court within whose ju-
risdiction the commissioning parent(s) are domiciled or habitu-
ally resident.11
If good cause is shown, the court may dispense with the require-
ment that the surrogate mother and her spouse, civil union partner 
or permanent partner must be domiciled in South Africa.12 Louw13 
argues that if the commissioning parents have a foreign relative 
who is willing to act as altruistic surrogate mother, the court may 
be willing to dispense with the domicile requirement in respect of 
the surrogate mother.
No agreement will be confirmed by the High Court if the partner 
or spouse of the surrogate mother, as well as the partner or spouse 
of the commissioning parent, is not a party to the agreement and 
has not provided his/her consent to the arrangement in writing.14 
The court may confirm the agreement if a spouse or partner of the 
surrogate mother (who is not genetically related to the child to be 
born) unreasonably withholds the relevant consent.15
A surrogate agreement must be confirmed by the court before 
the surrogate mother is artificially inseminated.16 Artificial insemi-
nation may also not be performed on the surrogate mother after 
the lapse of 18 months after the confirmation of the agreement 
by the court.17 The surrogate motherhood agreement may also 
not be terminated after the artificial insemination of the surrogate 
mother.18 The artificial insemination of the surrogate mother must 
also be specifically authorised by the court which validates or con-
firms the surrogate motherhood agreement.19 There are additional 
legal requirements regarding the artificial insemination process, 
not referred to in the Children’s Act. These will be discussed below.
A court may also not confirm the agreement if the agreement 
does not make adequate provision for the contact, care, upbring-
ing and general welfare of the child, who is entitled to be born in a 
stable environment. The child’s position in the event of the death 
of one or both of the commissioning parents, or their divorce or 
separation before the birth of the child must be considered.20 The 
interests of the child to be born as a result of an agreement are of 
paramount importance, and regard must be taken of the personal 
circumstances and family situations of all the relevant parties.21
In addition to the domicile requirement relating to the commis-
sioning parent referred to above, a court will not confirm a surro-
gate motherhood agreement unless the commissioning parent or 
parents are unable to give birth to a child and this condition must 
be permanent and irreversible.22 
Recent case law relating to the 
contents of surrogate motherhood 
agreements
Recent judgments clearly illustrate that the requirements relating 
to surrogate motherhood agreements are far from clear. There are 
presently no regulations promulgated in terms of the Children’s 
Act relating to surrogacy. In view of this shortcoming, the Deputy 
Judge President of the South Gauteng High Court has issued a 
practice directive dealing with these applications.23
The first unreported judgment from the South Gauteng High 
Court, Ex Parte Applications for the Confirmation of three Surrogate 
Motherhood Agreements (GSJ),24 underlines some of the practical 
problems relating to surrogacy arrangements.25 In this case Judge 
Wepener, with Judge Victor concurring, postponed the applications 
sine die to give the applicants an opportunity to rectify their appli-
cations to enable the court to consider the matters on their merits. 
This judgment emphasises that court confirmation of the agreement 
is not a mere ‘rubber stamp’ and that the court, in considering all 
the facts on which the application is based, will regard the interests 
of the child to be born of paramount importance.26 Expert reports 
need to be very detailed and comprehensive and to provide enough 
factual exposition to support an expert’s recommendation.27 In this 
case, a psychologist’s on-line evaluation of one of the commission-
ing fathers28 was found to be unacceptable, as it reinforced an im-
pression of ‘babies for sale on order’.29
A more recent judgment of the North Gauteng High Court30 in 
October 2011 provides more clear instruction regarding the con-
tents of these agreements.31 In this judgment, Justices Tolmay and 
Kollapen stated that specific expenses in respect of the surrogate 
mother should be motivated in the agreement, as a danger exists 
that ‘generic payments for expenditure without specificity may well 
run the risk of disguising the payment of compensation’.32 Full de-
tails regarding the agency that facilitates the surrogate motherhood 
agreement should be disclosed.33 In addition, full details regarding 
the surrogate mother’s financial background and position should be 
investigated and explained, as should a comprehensive psychologi-
cal report regarding the suitability of the surrogate mother. The last-
mentioned must include details regarding how handing the baby 
over to the commissioning parents will affect her; as well as a full 
medical profile detailing the possible dangers that the pregnancy 
may hold for her or the intended child.34 Any disease that may be 
transmitted from mother to child, such as HIV, should also be dis-
closed.35 The court ruled that the origin of the gametes (not mention-
ing the identity of the gamete donor) must also be stated.
 The determination of the suitability or not of the commissioning 
parents or the surrogate mother is one that may be subjective. 
Quite rightly, the court cautioned that courts should ensure that 
when exercising their discretion in this regard, personal percep-
tions not influence any decision on the suitability of a person to 
either accept parenthood or act as a surrogate mother.36 However, 
previous criminal convictions, particularly relating to violent crimes 
or crimes of a sexual nature, must be disclosed, including the cir-
cumstances surrounding these.37 The judgment also provides a list 
of issues that the affidavit should contain. Some of these are: 38
• proof that all the requirements set out in the Children’s Act are 
satisfied, with documentary proof where relevant 
• details of any previous applications for surrogacy; the division 
in which the application was brought, whether this was granted 
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and/or refused, and if refused, the reasons for the refusal should 
be stated
• a clinical psychologist’s report in respect of the commissioning 
parents and a separate report relating to the surrogate and her 
partner
• a medical report regarding the surrogate mother, which must 
include the details referred to above
• details, and proof of payment of any compensation for services 
rendered, either to the surrogate herself or to the intermediary, 
the donor, the clinic or any third party involved in the process
• all agreements between the surrogate and any intermediary or 
any other person involved in the process
• full particulars, if any agency was involved, of any payment to 
such agency
• details, if any, if the commissioning parents have been charged 
with or convicted of a violent crime or a crime of sexual nature.
Specific legal requirements relating to 
the surrogate mother
Apart from the surrogate mother’s consent to the agreement, her 
husband or partner (including a same-sex partner),39 in instances 
where the surrogate mother is not the genetic parent of the child, 
e.g. in cases of full surrogacy,40 must also consent to the surrogate 
agreement and must become a party to the agreement.15 If this 
husband or partner unreasonably withholds his or her consent, the 
court may confirm the surrogate motherhood agreement without 
consent.15
The Children’s Act lists a number of legal requirements specifi-
cally relating to the surrogate mother, who:
• must be legally competent to enter into a surrogate motherhood 
agreement41
• must, in all respects, be a suitable person to act as surrogate 
mother42
• must understand and accept the legal consequences of the sur-
rogate motherhood agreement and the relevant provisions of 
the Children’s Act, including her rights and obligations in terms 
of the agreement and the provisions of the Act43
• must not be using surrogacy as a source of income44
• must have entered into the surrogate motherhood agreement 
for altruistic and not for commercial reasons45
• must have a documented history of at least one pregnancy and 
viable delivery46
• must have a living child of her own47 
• is obliged to hand over the child that is born as a result of the 
agreement, as soon as reasonably possible after the birth of the 
child to the commissioning parent(s).48
Does the surrogate mother have the 
right to terminate the agreement?
A surrogate mother, if the genetic parent of the child (in other 
words, in cases of partial surrogacy),49 has the right to terminate 
the surrogate motherhood agreement at any time prior to the lapse 
of 60 days after the birth of the child by filing notice to the court 
to this effect.50 A court will only terminate the confirmation of the 
agreement between the surrogate mother and the commission-
ing parents if convinced that the surrogate mother’s decision is 
a voluntary one and that she understands the consequences of 
the termination, and may issue any other order that it deems fit in 
the best interests of the child. The surrogate mother will incur no 
liability if she exercises this right, except to compensate the com-
missioning parents for the expenses they incurred in terms of the 
agreement, as provided for in the Act.51
These provisions clearly distinguish between full and partial sur-
rogacy in the context of acquiring parental rights. In the case of 
full surrogacy, the surrogate motherhood agreement will confer full 
parental rights to the commissioning parents from the moment of 
the child’s birth, whereas in the case of partial surrogacy, these are 
technically suspended for a ‘cooling-off’ period of 60 days follow-
ing the birth of the child, during which period the surrogate mother 
has the right to terminate the contract and keep the child.
Some have argued that forcing the surrogate mother to hand 
over the child against her will amounts to ‘sacrificing a woman’s re-
productive autonomy to the principle pacta servanda sunt’,52 even 
in cases of full surrogacy. The specific enforcement of a surrogate 
motherhood agreement against the will of the surrogate mother 
may also violate her rights to dignity, privacy and bodily autonomy, 
including the child’s right to dignity.53
The surrogate mother, or her partner, spouse or relatives, have 
no right of parenthood or care of the child born as a result of such 
agreement.54 The surrogate mother, or her partner, spouse or rela-
tives, also has no right of contact with the child so born, unless so 
indicated in the surrogate motherhood agreement.55
Legal requirements relating to the 
artificial insemination of the surrogate 
mother
The artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother must also comply 
with the relevant regulations published in terms of the National 
Health, which came into operation on 2 March 2012.56 Prior to the 
promulgation of these regulations, guidance had to be sought from 
draft regulations.57 Similar to the 2012 regulations relating to artifi-
cial fertilisation, the  1986 regulations relating to artificial fertilisa-
tion were not intended to include surrogacy within their ambit, but 
did not preclude the practice either.58  Specific regulations relating 
to surrogate motherhood, issued in terms of the Children’s Act, are 
desperately needed, as those relating to artificial fertilisation only 
regulate the artificial fertilisation process itself. 
It is necessary to briefly note the difference between the con-
cepts ‘artificial insemination’ and ‘artificial fertilisation’, as the dif-
ferent sets of regulations refer to both terms. Although the 1986 
regulations referred to ‘artificial insemination’ in the description of 
the title of the regulations, the Human Tissue Act referred to the 
‘artificial fertilisation of a person’.59 The 2012 regulations, similar 
to the draft regulations of 2011, define ‘artificial fertilisation’ as 
‘the introduction by other than natural means of a male gamete 
or gametes into the internal reproductive organs of a female per-
son for the purpose of human reproduction and includes artificial 
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insemination, in vitro fertilisation, gamete intrafallopian tube trans-
fer, embryo intrafallopian transfer or intracytoplasmic sperm injec-
tion’. The same regulations, similar to the 2011 regulations, refer 
to ‘artificial insemination’ as the ‘placing of male gametes (sperm) 
into the female reproductive tract by means other than copulation’. 
Artificial insemination is thus more limited than the wide term of 
artificial fertilisation and one specific assisted reproductive tech-
nique or method.
In terms of the 1986 regulations, artificial fertilisation could only be 
performed by a medical doctor or a person acting under his supervi-
sion,60 with the written consent of the woman and her husband or 
partner,61 after having complied with prescribed formalities relating 
to patient and donor files, tests, examinations, enquiries, consents, 
information, and so forth.62 Prior to the promulgation of the 2012 
regulations, and in view of the limitations of the 1986 regulations, 
reproductive specialists followed the draft 2007 and 2011 regula-
tions relating to the artificial fertilisation of persons, which mirrored 
international practice standards and requirements.57 The 2012 regu-
lations, almost identical to the 2011 regulations, stipulate that only 
three zygotes or embryos (or less) may be transferred to the recipi-
ent (e.g. surrogate mother) during an embryo transfer procedure, 
unless a medical reason requires otherwise.63 If the surrogate moth-
er provides her own ova for the creation of the embryo, she must 
comply with specific requirements (e.g. relating to age, medical, 
genetic and psychological history) regarding gamete donors.64 The 
regulations stipulate that ova taken from a woman younger than 18 
years may not be used in artificial insemination,65 whereas the 2008 
Practice Guidelines issued by the Southern African Society of Re-
productive Medicine and Endoscopic Surgery (SASREG) regard-
ing Gamete Donation,66 state than donors younger than 21 years 
should first be evaluated by a psychologist. The preferable age of 
female donors is between 21 and 34 years. The same guidelines 
caution that oocyte donation treatment performed on postmenopau-
sal women, e.g. women older than 50 years, be considered with 
caution. This means that if a surrogate mother provides her own 
eggs (e.g. partial surrogacy), she should not be younger than 18 
years old, but preferably between 21 and 34 years. If she only car-
ries the child for the commissioning parents (full surrogacy), she 
should preferably not be older than 50 years. The Tzaneen grand-
mother Pat Anthony, who made history in 1987 when she gave birth 
to her own grandchild, was the exception and it is unlikely that a 
similar situation will arise in South Africa in future.
What kind of payments may be made to 
the surrogate mother?
The statutory provisions relating to surrogacy are clear on pay-
ments in respect of surrogacy. The type of expenses that are 
recognised clearly point to a prohibition of commercial surrogacy. 
Apart from the fact that no person in relation to a surrogate moth-
erhood agreement may promise or give to another person, or re-
ceive from another person, any compensation, money or reward 
of any kind,67 no promise or agreement for the payment of any 
compensation to the surrogate mother or any other person, includ-
ing for the execution of such an agreement will be enforceable,68 
except in the case of a claim for:
• compensation for expenses directly related to the artificial fertili-
sation of the surrogate mother, the resulting pregnancy, the birth 
of the child, and the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood 
agreement by the High Court69
• loss of earnings incurred by the surrogate mother as a result of 
the surrogate motherhood agreement,70 or
• insurance to indemnify the surrogate mother for death or disabil-
ity that may result from the pregnancy and the birth of the child 
she agreed to carry.71
Medical or legal professionals providing a bona fide profession-
al service relating to the surrogate motherhood agreement (e.g. 
drawing up of the contract) and its execution (e.g. the artificial in-
semination of the surrogate mother), are entitled to reasonable 
compensation for their services.72
Despite these provisions, a commissioning couple launched 
a court application in January 2011 in the Durban High Court to 
compel the surrogate mother carrying their child to keep her part 
of the agreement, as it had transpired that this woman had made 
a ‘wish list’, which included a Volkswagen Polo motor vehicle and 
an amount of R100 000. The surrogate mother, in an agreement 
following the application, agreed to surrender her rights to the child 
and to receive R10 000 a month for the period of her pregnancy, 
as well as R70 000 for her loss of income. The commissioning par-
ents would cover the medical expenses relating to the pregnancy 
and birth for a period up to 3 months after the birth.73
May agencies advertise for the services 
of surrogate mothers?
The advertising (for profit or with the view to compensation) of a 
woman’s desire to enter into a surrogate motherhood agreement is 
specifically prohibited.74 This means that it is illegal to broker sur-
rogacy arrangements on a commercial basis. However, a woman 
is free to offer her services to enter into a surrogate motherhood 
agreement that complies with the provisions of the Act and in terms 
of which she will only be compensated for reasonable expenses 
provided for in the Act. Advertisements for egg donors in South 
Africa are common and offer to pay between R5 000 and R6 000 
per donation.75 The same agencies recruiting egg donors normally 
also advertise for surrogate mothers,76 but refer the process to the 
relevant artificial insemination clinics and lawyers specialising in 
surrogacy arrangements.77
A few ethical concerns
With the artificial insemination of the surrogate mother in cases 
of full surrogacy, more than one embryo (but not more than three) 
may be transferred to the surrogate mother’s uterus, which may 
result in the birth of more than one surrogate child. Whether the 
birth of surrogate twins or triplets is desirable or in the best inter-
ests of these children, is a separate question that must be carefully 
considered.
The surrogacy provisions clearly require that a child contemplat-
ed in terms of a valid surrogate motherhood agreement will need 
to be genetically related to both the commissioning parents, or if 
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this is impossible as a result of medical or biological or other valid 
reasons, related to at least one of the commissioning parents.78 
This provision is deemed harsh and discriminatory by practising 
reproductive specialists, as it is possible that both the commis-
sioning parents may suffer from (male or female) infertility. Some 
legal scholars, however, argue that to allow surrogacy where the 
commissioning parent is or both are infertile would amount to a 
‘commissioned adoption’ and would hence be unacceptable.79 It 
would also prevent the practice of commissioning parents ‘shop-
ping around’ with the intention to create children with specific char-
acteristics. An ordinary adoption for these persons is not always 
possible, as Pretorius80 points out. There may be long waiting 
lists for new-born white babies or the person or couple may be 
too old to qualify as an adoptive parent(s). Such a provision may 
also infringe an infertile person’s right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction, entrenched in section 12(2)(a) of the South African 
Constitution, including his or her rights to dignity and privacy.81
It is also likely that some surrogate mothers, despite the Act 
limiting payment to reasonable expenses only, may be desper-
ate enough to enter into these contracts for the limited financial 
benefit that they may receive. This concern has also been ex-
pressed in the recent judgment in the North Gauteng High Court. 
The court mentioned the deep socio-economic disparities and the 
prevalence of poverty as factors that may increase the possibility 
of abuse of underprivileged women who enter into these agree-
ments solely for the financial benefit,30 however limited this may 
be. The cost of full surrogacy is high (currently estimated around 
R200 000),82 which makes this clearly an option for the affluent 
only. This illustrates how difficult it is to achieve a nuanced balanc-
ing of the rights and interests of all the parties to a surrogate ar-
rangement. The best interests of the child, of course, are of para-
mount importance.83
Conclusion
The clarity that chapter 19 of the Children’s Act has brought in 
respect of the regulation of surrogate motherhood is welcomed. 
However, as the discussion above has shown, there are still some 
practical legal and ethical issues that remain, despite the guidance 
found in recent judgments.
To return to the scenario described at the outset of this article:
The domiciliary requirement relating to the commissioning cou-
ple discussed in this article makes it clear that as neither Mr A 
nor Mrs A is domiciled in the Republic, Dr X will be unable to 
artificially inseminate Miss B, who is also a foreign national and 
not domiciled in the Republic. The High Court will not confirm 
any surrogate motherhood agreement concluded between Mr 
and Mrs A and Miss B, which means that the agreement will 
be unenforceable and invalid. As a consequence, the surrogate 
mother (Miss B) will be the legal parent of the child that will be 
born, even if Mr A donates the sperm for the artificial insemina-
tion of Miss B. Dr X also needs to ensure that the agency that 
recruits the surrogate mother complies with the legal require-
ments discussed above.
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